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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2019
TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING
GROUP MEETING (TTDWG), NOVEMBER 30, 2009

REF: GENEVA 1175 (SFO-GVA-VII-071)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-076.

¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 30, 2009
Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:45 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

¶3. (S) The Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG) agreed to send Article II of the draft treaty to conforming with one remaining bracket. The Russian delegation also put forth a new proposal for Article III. The United States dropped its position that ICBM and SLBM launchers should be "considered to contain" a missile and adopted the Russian position on deployed missiles and launchers. This allowed conceptual agreement on the ICBM and SLBM sections of Article III with the final wording to be determined after the Definitions Subgroup completed the definitions of deployed ICBM and SLBM. The Russian delegation also put forth a new proposed Article IV on locating non-deployed items. The U.S. delegation raised several questions and deferred further comment until the proposal could be studied in detail.

¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Treaty Article II; Treaty Article III; and Treaty Article IV

TREATY ARTICLE II

¶15. (S) Admiral Kuznetsov asked whether the United States had any comments on treaty Article II. Mr. Taylor responded that the United States proposed inserting the word "nuclear" in paragraph 1(b) so the sentence would read, "...and nuclear warheads on ((or associated with))1 deployed heavy bombers." Kuznetsov concurred and both sides agreed to send the article to the Conforming Group with the one remaining bracket.

TREATY ARTICLE III

¶16. (S) Kuznetsov next stated that the Russian delegation had studied the U.S. working paper on Article III (Reftel) carefully, especially paragraph 3. It agreed with paragraph 1, paragraph 2--except for subparagraph 2(b), paragraph 3, and paragraph 4--except for subparagraph 4(c). (Begin comment: All these paragraphs dealt with counting rules, specifically what would count against the central limits and when new items of strategic offensive arms (SOA) would begin to count. End comment.) Taylor asked Kuznetsov to explain what the Russian side meant by the term "protective device" in the description of when a silo launcher began to count under the treaty. After a brief discussion both sides agreed that "silo door" was a better term in the Russian bracket and that it had been used in the START Treaty, but Taylor

retained the option to confirm it with the Conversion or Elimination (Core) Working Group. The Russian delegation then tabled a proposed joint draft text (JDT) for Article III.

¶17. (S) Kuznetsov directed the U.S. delegation's attention to a new proposed paragraph on deployed SOA. Kuznetsov made the point that it was important to state in the treaty article exactly which SOA would be counted.

Begin Text:

4bis. Strategic offensive arms shall be counted toward the aggregate limits provided for by this Treaty as follows:

(a) ICBMs or SLBMs: from the time an ICBM or SLBM is installed in an ICBM or SLBM launcher to the time the ICBM or SLBM is removed from the ICBM or SLBM launcher;

(b) Heavy bomber: from the time a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments begins to be attributed to an airbase to the time when it ceases to be attributed to this airbase;

(c) Warheads:

(i) On ICBMs or SLBMs: from the time a reentry vehicle is placed on an ICBM or SLBM to the time the reentry vehicle is removed from a deployed ICBM or SLBM, or this ICBM or SLBM is removed from a deployed ICBM or SLBM launcher with a front section containing reentry vehicles;

(ii) On heavy bombers:

(A) If nuclear armaments are absent on a deployed heavy bomber: from the time a heavy bomber begins to be attributed to an airbase to the time when a heavy bomber ceases to be attributed to an airbase. In addition, one warhead shall be counted for each deployed heavy bomber;

(B) If nuclear armaments are present on a deployed heavy bomber: from the time each nuclear armament unit is installed on a deployed heavy bomber to the time that the nuclear armament unit is removed from that deployed heavy bomber.

End Text.

18. (S) After reviewing the Russian proposal, Taylor responded that the United States was prepared to drop the phrase, "considered to contain" in its proposed text regarding definitions of deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs. The United States was prepared to accept the Russian position on what constituted deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. Therefore, the current agreed text in Article III, paragraphs 1 and 2, encompassed the intent of the proposed Russian paragraph 4. Taylor continued that the current agreed text was simplified, not redundant, and properly covered the counting of deployed SOA and warheads. Kuznetsov replied that this logic was clear to him; however, he asked how the United States would interpret the case of a deployed missile that had no warheads emplaced on it. Taylor responded that this would count as an SDV but with zero warheads. The Russian side also agreed with this interpretation. Taylor then noted that the United

States still disagreed with the Russian formulation of the counting rules for heavy bomber nuclear armaments and this text should remain bracketed. Ms. Kotkova asked to confirm that the United States still agreed to paragraph 1(c) that, "Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one unit." Taylor concurred.

19. (S) The Working Group next addressed the bracketed text in paragraph 5 pertaining to when items ceased to be subject to the treaty, "((recorded))1 ((determined))2" within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). Kotkova stated that "recorded" did not translate properly into Russian without reference to what was being recorded. Mr. Brown agreed that this needed further explanation. Taylor stated that this was tied to the "wildcard" procedures being developed in the CorE Working Group and so both sides agreed to wait until that group provided more clarity.

110. (S) Kuznetsov opened discussion of paragraph 6 and said the Russian delegation objected to subparagraphs (b) and (c) on not counting non-nuclear ballistic missiles and on counting ballistic missiles if any of the type had been tested for nuclear weapon delivery. Taylor agreed to drop subparagraph (b) and to drop the word "nuclear" from (c). Kuznetsov asked whether the working group should define "new type." Taylor responded that both sides already had proposed definitions. Col Kamenskiy then explained the Russian view that any newly developed system would go through the proper notifications and BCC procedures, eventually becoming an existing type captured under the provisions. Therefore, he stated, the subparagraph was superfluous. Taylor stated that the United States would consider this point of view. Kuznetsov remarked that the Russian delegation had no issues with subparagraph (d) on distinguishing heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments from those equipped for non-nuclear armaments.

111. (S) The discussion on paragraph 7 centered on the naming convention to be used for existing types. The Russian delegation expressed the desire that only one term be used for each system. Taylor asked about Russia's existing types of heavy bomber armaments and especially when the Russian delegation expected to list their existing types. Kuznetsov responded, "sometime." He added that he was waiting for additional guidance from Moscow.

TREATY ARTICLE IV

112. (S) Kuznetsov tabled a Russian proposal for Article IV covering locational restrictions for deployed and non-deployed SOA.

Begin Text:

1. Each Party shall locate and base deployed strategic offensive arms only at ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air

bases.

¶2. Each Party shall locate:

- (a) Non-deployed ICBMs or SLBMs only at ICBM bases,

submarine bases, ICBM or SLBM loading facilities, repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, training facilities, test ranges, and production facilities. Prototype ICBMs and SLBMs shall not be located at ICBM bases or submarine bases.

(b) Non-deployed ICBM or SLBM launchers only at ICBM bases, submarine bases, production facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs or ballistic missile submarines, repair facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, storage facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, conversion or elimination facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, training facilities, test ranges, and production facilities.

¶3. Each Party shall base non-deployed heavy bombers only at air bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, heavy bomber flight test centers, production facilities for heavy bombers, training facilities for heavy bombers, repair facilities for heavy bombers, and conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers.

¶4. Non-deployed ICBMs or SLBMs as well as non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may be in transit. Each Party shall limit the duration of each transit between facilities to no more than 30 days.

¶5. Each Party shall provide to the other Party notification concerning the transfer of deployed strategic offensive arms into non-deployed strategic offensive arms and vice versa in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty.

¶6. The number of ICBM and SLBM test launchers and training launchers shall not be increased beyond those needed for testing and training purposes.

End Text.

¶13. (S) Taylor stated that the Russian approach was quite logical, with the understanding that it omitted the U.S. position on limits to mobile launchers of ICBMs and test heavy bombers. Dr. Fraley asked the Russian delegation to clarify the separation of transit concepts into a separate paragraph. Kuznetsov replied that it allowed for the easier separation of clauses that applied specifically to mobile launchers of ICBMs. The U.S. side expressed its understanding but offered that paragraph 4 might make a more logical fit as subparagraph (c) of paragraph 2. Kuznetsov agreed. Fraley then noted that since the U.S. side had dropped the "considered to contain" concept, it would have to consider carefully the implications for non-deployed SLBM launchers in subparagraph 2(b). Fraley then took up discussion of paragraph 5, noting that the English translation of "concerning the transfer of deployed SOA into non-deployed SOA" was vague. Both sides agreed that the issues were tied up with both Article VIII and notifications, and agreed to defer further discussion.

¶14. (S) Looking at paragraph 6, Taylor stated that the paragraph as worded raised several questions. He asked what the test and training requirements would be and who would decide whose needs would dictate the number. Kuznetsov responded that this was an area that required mutual trust.

Taylor retorted, "Trust but with a limit." Kuznetsov said that he would raise the subject with his delegation but rejected any limits on non-deployed SOA. Taylor ended the discussion with a request to seriously consider limits on non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers as this was a necessary requirement to dropping the U.S. proposal of "considered to

contain."

¶15. (U) Documents provided:

- UNITED STATES:

- U.S. Working Paper, Article IV, November 30, 2009

- RUSSIA:

- Russian-Proposed JDT for Article III, November 29, 2009; and

- Russian-Proposed JDT for Article IV, November 30, 2009

¶16. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Mr. Taylor
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Connell
Dr. Dreicer
Dr. Fraley
Mr. Hanchett
LTC LaGrafte
Mr. Marshall
Mrs. Zdravecky
Mr. Sobchenko (Int)

RUSSIA

ADM Kuznetsov
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Mr. Kamenskiy
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Trifinov
Mr. Pogodin (Int)

¶17. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS